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Nature of the Case

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Rodney Blackburn contends the district court erred when it summarily dismissed
his petition for post-conviction relief, as he had alleged at least one genuine issue of
material fact in his verified petition.

Specifically, he alleged that trial counsel was

ineffective for not advising him about the ramifications of not filing an appeal, but rather,
erroneously advising him to file a motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter,
Rule 35 motion) instead of pursuing a direct appeal.
Because Mr. Blackburn’s allegations establish that trial counsel did not fulfill his
duty to consult with him as that duty has been defined by the United States Supreme
Court, and because a Rule 35 motion is not an alternative to a direct appeal,
Mr. Blackburn’s allegations establish at least a genuine issue of material fact that trial
counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable. Additionally, since the United
States Supreme Court has determined there is a presumption of prejudice when
counsel’s objectively deficient performance deprives the defendant of an appeal he
would have otherwise pursued, Mr. Blackburn’s allegations, combined with the fact
found by the district court – that Mr. Blackburn “agreed” with counsel’s advice –
establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding prejudice.

As such, summary

dismissal of the petition was inappropriate.
Therefore, this Court should vacate the Final Judgment as well as the order
summarily dismissing the post-conviction petition, and remand this case for further
proceedings.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In his underlying criminal case, Mr. Blackburn pleaded guilty to violating a no
contact order and was sentenced to a unified term of four years, with one year fixed.
(R., p.4.) In his subsequent petition for post-conviction relief, he argued, inter alia, that
“[t]rial counsel coerced Petitioner into foregoing filing a notice of appeal from his
conviction and sentence by giving faulty advice to file a Rule 35 instead.” (R., p.7.)
Specifically, Mr. Blackburn alleged trial counsel had not discussed “the
ramifications of not filing an appeal” with him, but instead, advised him that “‘[a]n appeal
is not necessary’ and ‘that a Rule 35 would be more appropriate.’”

(R., p.7.)

Additionally, “[t]he petitioner contends why would he not avail[] himself of this right as he
had absolutely nothing to lose by appealing and possibl[y] much to gain.” (R., p.7.)
“Second petitioner finds fault with trial counsel because the very reason counsel cited
for not filing the notice of appeal was the presentation of a Rule 35, of which he did not
do.”1 (R, p.7.)
In providing notice of its intent to summarily dismiss Mr. Blackburn’s petition, the
district court found that “Counsel gave his advice as to the best manner to proceed and
the Petitioner agreed.” (R., p.49.) Mr. Blackburn did not file a response to the district

In the interest of full disclosure and accurate understanding of the procedural history of
this matter, undersigned counsel notes that, after Mr. Blackburn filed his petition for
post-conviction relief, trial counsel filed an untimely, unsupported Rule 35 motion with
the district court in the criminal case. (See Online Repository for the underlying case,
CR 2015-7210). Undersigned counsel is informed and believes the district court
ultimately denied that motion, addressing the merits of the claim when it did so.
However, those documents were not made part of the post-conviction record, nor was
the matter discussed by the district court or the parties in the post-conviction case.
(See generally R., Tr.) As such, Mr. Blackburn is not moving to augment the record with
them, nor would it be proper to consider them in this appeal.
1
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court’s notice of intent to dismiss. (See Tr., p.3, Ls.2-7; see generally R.) Pursuant to
its notice of intent, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Blackburn’s claim about
trial counsel’s advice to not file a notice of appeal, concluding: “Petitioner provides no
facts to show that counsel’s advice not to appeal was deficient due to any of these
factors [related to a review of counsel’s strategic decisions] or was otherwise not
reasonable.”

(R., p.56.)

Furthermore, it concluded:

“The fact that every person

convicted of a crime may file an appeal does not mean there is a valid basis for appeal
in every case.

As such, Petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case of

ineffective assistance of counsel.” (R., p.56.)
Mr. Blackburn filed a notice of appeal timely from the Final Judgment dismissing
his petition. (R., pp.60, 62.)
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Blackburn’s petition for
post-conviction relief.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Blackburn’s Petition For PostConviction Relief
A.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from a summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, the

appellate court “reviews the record to determine if issues of material fact exist, which
require an evidentiary hearing.” Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370 (Ct. App. 2001);
cf. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008) (holding that a petition for postconviction relief may be summarily dismissed only if it does not present a genuine issue
of material fact). In conducting that review, the appellate court accepts the district
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, but reviews the district court’s
application of the relevant law to those facts de novo. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56
(2004).
To show a genuine issue of material fact in regard to a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel,2 the petitioner must allege facts which demonstrate that
counsel’s performance fell below a reasonable standard and that the petitioner was
prejudiced by that deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984); McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850 (2004). In evaluating whether there is a
genuine issue of material fact, the courts “liberally construe the facts and reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party,” in this case, Mr. Blackburn. Nevarez v.
State, 145 Idaho 878, 881 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho

Defendants have the right to reasonably-effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 359-60
(Ct. App. 1994).

2
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789, 792 (2004) (“[I]nferences [are] liberally construed in favor of the petitioner.”). The
allegations in a petitioner’s verified petition alone may establish a genuine issue of
material fact. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993).
B.

The District Court’s Analysis In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Blackburn’s Claim
About The Advice To Pursue A Rule 35 Motion Instead Of A Direct Appeal Is
Contrary To Idaho Supreme Court And United States Supreme Court Precedent
The district court’s determination that Mr. Blackburn’s allegations of fact – that

trial counsel did not discuss the ramifications of not appealing, told him that “an appeal
was not necessary,” and advised him that a Rule 35 motion was “more appropriate” and
so, he should pursue that motion instead (R., p.7) – did not present a genuine issue of
material fact is mistaken in regard to both prongs of the Strickland analysis.
To the first prong of that analysis, to perform in an objectively-reasonable
manner, trial counsel must fulfill his duty to consult with a defendant about a direct
appeal once the defendant has reasonably demonstrated an interest in appealing.
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000). Mr. Blackburn’s allegations establish
that he expressed at least an interest in appealing, otherwise counsel’s advice that a
direct appeal is “not necessary” makes no sense.

(See R., p.7.)

Therefore, trial

counsel was duty-bound to consult with Mr. Blackburn about the direct appeal.
The United States Supreme Court has explained: “We employ the term ‘consult’
to convey a specific meaning—advising the defendant about the advantages and
disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to discover the
defendant’s wishes.” Id. at 478. Mr. Blackburn alleged counsel did not discuss the
ramifications of not filing an appeal with him.

(R., p.7.)

That alleged fact alone

establishes a genuine issue of material fact in regard to deficient performance because,
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if liberally construed in Mr. Blackburn’s favor, it demonstrates trial counsel did not fulfill
his duty to consult with Mr. Blackburn as that duty has been defined by the United
States Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the advice trial counsel gave in his attempt to fulfill that duty was
unreasonable on its face as it was contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent. The
Idaho Supreme Court has clearly held: “Rule 35 does not function as an appeal of the
sentence.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). Rather, the two proceedings
serve different purposes. On the one hand, Rule 35 “is a narrow rule” which only allows
the defendant to dispute the legality of his sentence, to request leniency in the
sentence, or to challenge the calculation of credit for time served. See id.; I.C.R. 35(a)(c). Thus, Rule 35 is designed to allow the district court to review the sentence in light
of new or additional information. See Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203. In a direct appeal of
the sentence, on the other hand, the appellate court only reviews the information that
had been before the district court at the time of sentencing. See, e.g. State v. Oliver,
144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007). Therefore, a Rule 35 motion is not an alternative to a direct
appeal, which means it cannot stand in the stead of a direct appeal. As such, trial
counsel’s advice to Mr. Blackburn – to pursue a Rule 35 motion instead of a direct
appeal (R., p.7) – was objectively unreasonable advice.
Since the facts alleged in Mr. Blackburn’s verified petition, liberally construed in
his favor, establish that trial counsel failed to fulfill his duty to consult with Mr. Blackburn,
and gave objectively unreasonable advice in his attempt to do so, Mr. Blackburn’s
allegations established a genuine issue of material fact under the first prong of
Strickland.
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As to the second prong of Strickland, Mr. Blackburn alleged sufficient facts to
establish a genuine issue of material fact that counsel’s objectively-deficient
performance prejudiced him. The United States Supreme Court has held that, “when
counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that
he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out a successful ineffective
assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 478.
Therefore, a presumption of prejudice exists in this context, meaning all the defendant is
required to show in his petition is that he would have filed the appeal. See FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. at 478. The reason that is so is that the “loss [of the opportunity to
appeal] is itself sufficient prejudice to support a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel . . . .” Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 362 (Ct. App. 1994); cf. Flores-Ortega,
528 U.S. at 483.
Mr. Blackburn alleged as much in his verified petition: “The petitioner contends
why would he not avail[] himself of this right as he had absolutely nothing to lose by
appealing and possibl[y] much to gain.” (R., p.7.) Although framed as a rhetorical
question, what Mr. Blackburn alleged is, but for the erroneous advice about Rule 35
being a valid alternative to the direct appeal, he would have exercised his right to
appeal “as he had absolutely nothing to lose and possibl[y] much to gain.”

Cf.

Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792 (“[I]nferences [are] liberally construed in favor of the
petitioner.”).

Therefore, there was at least a genuine issue of material fact as to

prejudice under the standard articulated in Flores-Ortega.
The district court, however, did not apply the Flores-Ortega standard. Instead, it
required Mr. Blackburn to show there was a valid basis for an appeal. (R., p.56 (“The
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fact that every person convicted of a crime may file an appeal does not mean that there
is a valid basis for an appeal. Petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel.”). The United States Supreme Court has expressly
rejected such analysis: “[I]t is unfair to require an indigent, perhaps pro se, defendant to
demonstrate that his hypothetical appeal might have had merit before any advocate has
ever reviewed the record in his case in search of potentially meritorious grounds for
appeal.”3 Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 486 (emphasis from original omitted). Rather, as
the Idaho Court of Appeals has explained, “the defendant should not be required to
identify the meritorious issues that would have been raised, but should be restored to
the status enjoyed immediately following the judgment of conviction when the defendant
was entitled to a direct appeal.” Beasley, 126 Idaho at 361. Therefore, the district
court’s analysis on this issue was improper and should be rejected.
Since Mr. Blackburn’s allegations establish at least a genuine issue of material
fact on both prongs of the Strickland test, as they have been defined by Idaho and
United States Supreme Court precedent, summary dismissal of his claim about
counsel’s erroneous advice to forgo his right to an appeal and file a Rule 35 motion
instead was inappropriate.

The Supreme Court made this declaration about the need to have an attorney review
the record for appellate issues even though defendant in Flores-Ortega had been
represented by counsel in the trial court and that attorney had, at least, considered the
possibility of an appeal. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 473.
3
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Blackburn respectfully requests that this Court vacate the Final Judgment as
well as the order summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition and remand this case
for further proceedings.
DATED this 13th day of September, 2016.
___________/s/______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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